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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 208: Insanity which extends statute of limitations includes
temporary mental incapacity to protect one's rights arising from
physical injury.
CPLR 208 extends the statute of limitations if a person entitled
to bring an action is insane when it accrues.13 The first definition of
insanity under CPLR 208 was recently presented in Hurd v. County
of Allegany,14 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, construing
the term to include "a temporary mental incapacity to protect one's
rights resulting from a physical injury...."-15
The plaintiff was injured on August 30, 1969, in an automobile
accident on a county road, allegedly as a result of the county's negli-
gence. She suffered brain damage and had significant problems with
memory and concentration through early 1970. On July 10, 1971, the
plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant. Noting that the
one year and ninety-day limitation period provided by the General
Municipal Law10 for tort claims against a municipality is subject to
tolling under CPLR 208,17 the court looked to the generic manner in
which other states have construed their counterparts of CPLR 208 and
unanimously held that the plaintiff's temporary mental incapacity
arising from the accident constituted insanity within the meaning of
CPLR 208.18 The court concluded that a fact-finding hearing should
be ordered to determine when the plaintiff's mental disability ceased.19
CPLR 211(b): Support order qualifies as money judgment subject to
conclusive presumption of payment after twenty years.
CPLR 211(b) creates a conclusive presumption of payment "after
the expiration of twenty years from the time when the party recovering
[a money judgment] was first entitled to enforce it. ' ' 20 In In re Estate
13 If the statute of limitations is three years or more and has expired, the disabled
person has three years from the end of the disability in which to sue. If the statute of
limitations is less than three years, it is extended by the period of the disability. An
extension exceeding ten years is allowed only for infancy. See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 208,
commentary at 261-62 (1972).
14 39 App. Div. 2d 499, 336 N.YS.2d 952 (4th Dep't 1972).
15 Id. at 502, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
16 GML 50-i(l)(c).
17 39 App. Div. 2d at 502, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 956, citing Corbett v. Fayetteville-Manlius
Cent. School Dist., 34 App. Div. 2d 879, 311 N.YS2d 540 (4th Dep't 1970). Accord, Ab-
batemarco v. Town of Brookhaven, 26 App. Div. 2d 664, 272 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep't
1966) (mem.); LaFave v. Town of Franklin, 20 App. Div. 2d 738, 247 N.YS.2d 72 (8d
Dep't 1964) (mem.).
18 Id. at 502-03, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 956-57, citing, e.g., Gottesman v. Simon, 169 Cal.
App. 2d 494, 337 P.2d 906 (4th Ct. App. 1959); Browne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d
239 (1949); Sobin v. M. Frisch & Sons, 108 N.J. Super. 99, 260 A.2d 228 (App. Div. 1969).
19 89 App. Div. 2d at 503-04, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
20 See generally Brinkman v. Cram, 175 App. Div. 372, 161 N.Y.S. 965 (Ist Dep't 1916),
aff'd, 225 N.Y. 720, 122 N.E. 877 (1919); 1 WK&-M 211.03.
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of Haggart,21 the Surrogate's Court, Chautauqua County, determined
whether the decedent's former wife was entitled to apply the tventy-
year period to her claim against his estate arising out of support pay-
ments, rather than the six-year residuary statute of limitations
prescribed in CPLR 213(1).22
The plaintiff had obtained a number of court orders requiring
the decedent to pay varying amounts for the support of herself and her
children. The court distinguished between a claim based on a separa-
tion agreement and one due under a final decree of a court. The
former, being contractual, is governed by the six-year statute of limita-
tions;23 the latter is considered a money judgment,24 imposing a
liability on one spouse to pay a sum certain to the other,25 and thus
subject to the twenty-year time limit.
This sound decision clarifies that court-ordered support payments
are judgment debts, and thus gives greater protection to a spouse en-
titled to such monies.
ARTICLE 3- -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 301: Parent corporation found to be doing business in New
York on agency theory.
Jurisdiction may be exercised over a nondomiciliary parent
corporation on the basis of its subsidiary's activities within the state
if the subsidiary is deemed for jurisdictional purposes either (1) a mere
department of the parent, or (2) the parent's agent performing "all
the business which [the parent] could do were it here by its own
officials." 2 Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co.27 illustrates the
prerequisites to a finding of the latter relationship.
In Sunrise Toyota, the publicly-owned Japanese Toyota manu-
facturing (Factory) and distributing (Sales) companies jointly and
2171 Misc. 2d 157, 335 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sur. Ct. Chautauqua County 1972).
22 CPLR 213(1) establishes a six-year statute of limitations for actions for which no
limitation is specifically fixed by law.
23 See Haimes v. Schonwit, 268 App. Div. 652, 52 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 295
N.Y. 577, 64 N.E.2d 283 (1945); Winer v. Ginsburg, 35 Misc. 2d 1054, 231 N.Y.S.2d 622
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); Estate of Philippe, 31 Misc. 2d 193, 220 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1961), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 600, 198 N.E.2d 263, 248 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964).
24 CPLR 105(n) defines a money judgment as "a judgment, or any part thereof, for
a sum of money or directing the payment of a sum of money."
25See In re Bassford's Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sur Ct. Westchester County 1949),
af'd mei., 277 App. Div. 1128, 101 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dep't 1950).
26 See, e.g., Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y..2d 653 (1972),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 768, 772 (1972).
2755 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
[Vol. 47:580
